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INTRODUCTION

At the age of nineteen, Miasha Thomas bought her first house
1
in Saint Paul, Minnesota. Her earnings from a mail-sorting job
† The author is a 2009 J.D. candidate at William Mitchell College of Law;
B.A., Journalism and Mass Communications, University of Minnesota, 2001. He
thanks his parents, Marcia and Nicholas Hayes, for their support and assistance
when he decided to pursue a law degree, and the William Mitchell Law Review staff
for their tireless efforts.
1. Ron Nixon et al., Borrowing Trouble: A Star Tribune Special Report: Costly
Loans Turn Payday Into Debt Day, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 15, 2004, at 1A.
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barely covered her mortgage and modest living expenses. Without
3
warning, one day she lost her job. What she thought would be a
temporary setback extended into a long-term struggle to make ends
4
meet. So, one day, she gave into temptation and walked into a
5
store with a yellow sign advertising payday loans. She asked for a
6
$250 loan against her next paycheck. To qualify for the loan,
Thomas only needed an I.D., confirmation of a job, and a checking
7
account. The lender charged her $22.50 in fees and interest—
8
equivalent to a 469% annual percentage rate.
Thomas returned a few weeks later to borrow $350 and a week
9
later another $350, and yet another $350. She persuaded her
10
During a three-year
parents to take out payday loans for her.
11
period, Thomas incurred more than $2,100 in fees. Exorbitant
12
fees and interest rates eventually forced her to sell her home.
Payday lenders promise a lifeline but are actually a noose
around the neck for Thomas and thousands of Minnesota’s low13
income residents. A number of financial businesses have profited
during the past decade by targeting low-income populations who
struggle from paycheck to paycheck to make ends meet and have
14
been denied access to mainstream financial institutions.
Deregulation spawned the growth of these industries that prey
upon the increased number of people with bad credit, rising levels
15
of personal debt, and a growing immigrant population. Payday
lending is not only the fastest growing industry in the finance
16
17
sector, it is one of the fastest growing industries in America.
This article outlines the problems associated with payday
lending and Minnesota’s attempt to regulate the industry, and then
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Lisa Blaylock Moss, Commentary, Modern Day Loan Sharking: Deferred
Presentment Transactions & the Need for Regulation, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1725, 1731 (2000).
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recommends ways Minnesota can strengthen its regulation of the
industry and how other measures could prevent abusive payday
lending. Part II discusses the payday loans in detail. Part II.A
discusses the characteristics of payday loans and the industry’s
expansion in the United States.
Part II.B examines the
demographics of a payday loan consumer. Part II.C discusses the
troublesome features of payday loans. Part II involves a lengthy,
but essential discussion regarding the payday lending industries.
This extended discussion complements an intention to underscore
the predatory nature of the payday loan industry and the need for
reform. Part III describes Minnesota’s attempt to regulate the
payday lending industry and its shortcomings. Part IV proposes
ways to curb the abusive payday loan practices. Part IV.A specifies
ways to strengthen the current Minnesota Small Loan Consumer
Statute. Part IV.B details another method for preventing unfair
payday lending practices through litigation. Finally, Part IV.C
identifies ways in which banks and credit unions could provide
affordable, yet profitable, alternatives to payday loans.
II. PAYDAY LENDING IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Characteristics of a Payday Loan and the Industry’s Expansion in the
United States
1.

The Characteristics of Payday Loans

Payday lending is a component of the “alternative financial
18
services” or “fringe banking” industry in the United States. Many
traditional loan providers abandoned the risky small-loan industry
in favor of more profitable, larger loans, which had benefited from
the deregulation of the banking industry and elimination of
19
interest rate caps in the 1980s. The fringe-banking industry filled
the vacuum by promoting alternative financial services to
20
consumers with poor credit ratings or low to moderate incomes.
Payday lending comprises an important part of the fringe-banking
18. Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial
Services Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking
About the Role of Usury Laws in Today’s Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589, 591 (2000).
19. Moss, supra note 17, at 1732. See generally Christopher L. Peterson, Usury
Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight of Hand: Salience Distortion in American Credit
Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110 (2008) (discussing how state and federal
deregulation paved the way for payday lending).
20. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 18, at 591.
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industry by issuing small loans to high-risk consumers who lack
21
The loans are
access to mainstream financial institutions.
available at gas stations, pawn shops, convenience stores, ATMs, the
22
Internet, and traditional payday loan stores.
23
A payday lender makes short-term cash loans. Generally, the
24
payday loans have two-week terms and are for less than $1,000. In
states that specifically permit payday lending, allowable loan
25
amounts range from $300 to $1,000, with a common cap of $500.
To get a payday loan, a consumer typically gives the payday lender a
26
The
postdated check that includes the payday lender’s fee.
payday lender advances the amount of the check, excluding the fee
27
Other transactions use delayed automatic debit
in cash.
28
agreements as opposed to postdated checks. The payday lender
agrees to defer the deposit of the check or the automatic debit for
an agreed-upon time, which generally is tied to coincide with the
consumer’s next payday, or sometimes for a period of time for up
29
The application process is highly streamlined,
to a month.
30
requires minimal credit criteria, and provides cash immediately.
The process follows a typical pattern. The consumer gives a
payday lender a $115 check ($100 for the loan amount and $15 for
31
32
the fee). The consumer then receives $100 in cash. When the
21. Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87
MINN. L. REV. 1, 8 (2002).
22. STATE PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GROUPS & CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., SHOW
ME THE MONEY!: A SURVEY OF PAYDAY LENDERS AND REVIEW OF PAYDAY LENDER
LOBBYING IN STATE LEGISLATURES 1 (2000), http://www.uspirg.org/uploads/0J/
JI/0JJIxjolTQlIpsOOhaP_dg/showmethemoneyfinal.PDF [hereinafter SHOW ME
THE MONEY!].
23. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 18, at 600.
24. Id. at 602.
25. Since 1997, the Consumer Federation of America, which monitors the
payday lending industry, has published annual reports that include surveys of state
laws applicable to payday lending. CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., SMALL DOLLAR LOAN
PRODUCTS SCORECARD: STATUTORY BACKUP (2008), http://www.consumerfed.org/
pdfs/statutory_backup_08.pdf.
26. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 18, at 600–01.
27. Id. at 601.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. SHEILA BAIR, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., LOW-COST PAYDAY LOANS:
OPPORTUNITIES AND OBSTACLES 6 (2005), http://www.aecf.org/upload/
publicationfiles/fes3622h334.pdf.
31. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 18, at 601.
32. Id. To qualify for a payday loan at an UnBank, a Minnesota payday
lender, a consumer must be a Minnesota resident, eighteen years of age or older,
and must have a proof of a current checking account (minimum of three months

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss3/10

4

Hayes: A Noose Around the Neck: Preventing Abusive Payday Lending Practi

1138

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:3

payday loan comes due, the consumer can give the payday lender
$115 in cash or a money order to redeem the check and prevent
the automatic debit, or the consumer can let the payday lender
33
deposit the check or debit the account.
2.

The Expansion of the Payday Lending Industry in America

Payday lending began in 1993 in the United States when
34
Check Into Cash, Inc. opened its first store in Tennessee. The
industry developed by exploiting the loopholes in usury laws that
35
The industry
set ceilings on the rates charged for loans.
promoted itself as a less costly and more desirable alternative to
bank charges for insufficient fees, late charges on credit cards, or
36
utility reconnect fees. The industry maintained that it was not a
loan but instead a form of check-cashing services or sale of a
37
check. Even if it was a loan, the industry maintained that small
38
The
loan laws exempted the industry from state usury laws.
industry grew as regulators and state legislatures sought ways to
39
deal with reports of high-cost credit. According to some reports,
by May 2005 payday loan stores outnumbered McDonald’s
40
restaurants nationwide.
By 2005, there were roughly 23,000 to 25,000 payday lenders
located across the country that produced more than $40 billion in
41
The industry’s growth is driven by its immense
loans.
old), a checkbook, a current photo I.D., and a home phone number. UnBank,
http://www.unloan.com/HowItWorks.asp (last visited Mar. 6, 2009).
33. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 18, at 601.
34. Scott Andrew Schaaf, From Checks to Cash: The Regulation of the Payday
Lending Industry, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 339, 339 nn.3–4 (2001). Based in Cleveland,
Tennessee, Check Into Cash, Inc. opened its first outlet in 1993 and as of 2001 had
more than three-hundred outlets in fifteen states. Id. at 339 n.4 (citing JERRY L.
ROBINSON, STEPHENS INC., PAYDAY ADVANCE–THE FINAL INNINGS: STANDARDIZING THE
APPROACH 3, 4 (Sept. 22, 2000)).
35. Mary Spector, Taming the Beast: Payday Loans, Regulatory Efforts, and
Unintended Consequences, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 961, 964 (2008).
36. Cmty Fin. Servs. of Am., Payday Advance: Fact vs. Fiction,
http://www.cfsa.net/fact_vs_fiction.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).
37. Cashback Catalog Sales, Inc. v. Price, 102 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1380–81 (S.D.
Ga. 2000).
38. Spector, supra note 35, at 974.
39. Id.
40. See 60 Minutes II: Paying More for Payday Loans (CBS television broadcast
May 18, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/05/
16/60II/main695461.shtml).
41. Consumer Fed’n of Am., PayDay Loan Consumer Information,
http://www.paydayloaninfo.org/facts.cfm (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).
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42

profitability.
With 25,000 stores producing payday loans, the
43
The
industry generates $6.75 billion annually in fees alone.
industry reports a return on investment of 24% and gross margins
44
of 30% to 45% of annual revenue. In comparison, banks that are
not part of the fringe-banking sector average a 15% return on
45
46
Advance America, the largest monoline payday
investments.
lender, generated $630 billion in revenue in 2005, a 10.5% increase
47
from the previous year. Thus, payday loans produce exorbitant
48
profit margins for lenders, thereby inducing rapid market growth.
In Minnesota, the payday lending industry has grown
significantly. The industry grew from five companies and $33
million in loans in 1999 to twenty-four companies and $58 million
49
in loans in 2006. From 1999 to 2006, Minnesota consumers took
out about $1 million payday loans for total of more than $215
50
million.
B. Demographics of a Typical Payday Loan Consumer
The payday lending industry intimates that it provides a
51
valuable product to astute consumers. Industry-sponsored surveys
claim that more than half of payday loan consumers had family
52
incomes between $25,000 and $50,000. The same surveys stated
42. Michael Bertics, Fixing Payday Lending: The Potential of Greater Bank
Involvement, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 133, 136 (2005).
43. KATHLEEN E. KEEST & ELIZABETH RENUART, THE COST OF CREDIT:
REGULATION, PREMPTION, AND INDUSTRY ABUSES § 7.5.5.2 (3d ed. 2005).
44. Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 150 (2004).
45. Bertics, supra note 42, at 144–45.
46. A monoline payday lender offers only payday loans as opposed to phone
cards, checking cashing services, and title loans. BAIR, supra note 30, at 6 n.1.
47. Kelly J. Noyes, Note, Get Cash Until Payday! The Payday-Loan Problem in
Wisconsin, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1627, 1632 (2006) (citing ADVANCE AM., CASH ADVANCE
CTRS. INC., FORM 10K (ANNUAL REPORT) 47 (Mar. 16, 2006)).
48. See Bertics, supra note 42, at 141–42 (analyzing the principles that
encourage new market entrants).
49. H.J. Cummins, Legislators Seek to Curtail ‘Payday Lending’ Practices: The
Industry Argues that the Proposed Legislation to Limit Interest Rates Would Effectively Put It
Out of Business, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Feb. 24, 2008, at D1 (citing Minnesota
Department of Commerce data analyzed by the Legal Services Advocacy Project).
50. Id.
51. Pearl Chin, Note, Payday Loans: The Case for Federal Legislation, 2004 U. ILL.
L. REV. 723, 727 (2004).
52. NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR FIN. EDUC. & CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., THE DEBT
CYCLE: USING PAYDAY LOANS TO MAKE ENDS MEET 13 (2002),
http://www.nefe.org/Portals/0/NEFE_Files/Research%20and%20Strategy/Pers
onal%20Finance%20Papers%20white%20papers/05Debt%20Cycle%20Using%2
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that 90% of payday lending consumers had a high school diploma,
56% had at least some college education, and that a typical payday
53
lending consumer was a young female parent. Another industry
study suggested that most payday consumers fell within the lower
range of $25,000 and $50,000 with 23% reporting incomes of less
54
Yet another industry source described a typical
than $25,000.
payday loan consumer as “a responsible, hardworking middle class
55
American” with an average annual income of $33,000. The same
source claimed that one-third of these consumers owned their
56
homes and that they all had regular sources of income.
Yet, data from non-industry sources demonstrates that the
payday lenders exploit individuals who lack access to credit
alternatives or information that would permit comparison
57
One survey found that consumers were more often
shopping.
than not members of minority groups with a household income of
58
less than $25,000. They possessed at best a high school or GED
education, or more often less; were between eighteen and fifty-nine
59
years old; and were single females with dependents. The same
survey stated that payday lenders target welfare to work women and
60
considered them “a fertile market for payday lenders.” Another
0Payday%20Loans_Feb02.pdf [hereinafter THE DEBT CYCLE]; OFFICE OF [MO.]
STATE AUDITOR CLAIRE MCCASKILL, DIV. OF FIN. & REG. OF INSTANT LOAN INDUS.,
PERFORMANCE AUDIT 3 (2001), http://auditor.mo.gov/press/2001-36.pdf.
53. THE DEBT CYCLE, supra note 52, at 28–29.
54. GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN, PH.D. & EDWARD C. LAWRENCE, PH.D. CREDIT
RESEARCH CTR., PAYDAY ADVANCE CREDIT IN AMERICA: AN ANALYSIS OF CUSTOMER
DEMAND 3 (2001), http://www.cfsa.net/downloads/analysis_customer_demand.
pdf.
55. Schaaf, supra note 34, at 348 (quoting Forum on Short-Term High Interest
Paycheck Advances, U.S. Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, at 2 (Dec. 15, 1999)
(written testimony of Billy Webster, President, CFSA) (on file with N.C. Banking
Inst.)).
56. Id. at 349.
57. Chin, supra note 51, at 727.
58. JEAN ANN FOX & EDMUND MIERZWINSKI, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM. & U.S.
PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, RENT-A-BANK PAYDAY LENDING: HOW BANKS HELP
PAYDAY LENDERS EVADE STATE CONSUMER PROTECTIONS, THE 2001 PAYDAY LENDER
SURVEY AND REPORT (2001), http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/paydayreport.pdf.
59. Id.
60. Id. In 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (“PRWOR”), which implemented
rigorous work requirements for welfare recipients. Pub. L. No. 104-192, 110 Stat.
2105 (1996). The intent of PRWOR was to move welfare recipients from welfare
to work. Tammi D. Jackson, Free Social Services: Where Do I Enroll? – The True Cost
Welfare Recipients and Undocumented Immigrants Have on the U.S. Economy, 13 PUB.
INT. L. REP. 271, 273 (2008). Studies have shown that welfare to work women are a
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study showed that racial motivations have spurred the industry’s
61
growth. This study found that payday lenders were predominantly
located in lower-income African-American neighborhoods and
were scarcely represented in white neighborhoods with similar
62
income levels. Other state surveys found that the average payday
63
loan consumer generated an annual income of $25,000.
Furthermore, a disproportionate amount of payday lenders operate
in six states that have a median income level below the national
64
median.
In Minnesota, payday lenders filled the vacuum left by the fiftyseven bank branches that have disappeared from the Twin Cities
65
since 1996. In Minnesota, 56% of the payday loans occur in the
suburbs, with 27% in rural areas of Minnesota and 16% in
66
Minneapolis and Saint Paul. Moreover, data demonstrates that
67
these payday lenders target low-income consumers. A Minnesota
resident has a higher probability of living within a half-mile of a
payday lender based upon a lower median income level: $15,000:
88%; $30,000: 73%; $45,000: 50%; $60,000: 27%; $75,000: 12%;
68
$90,000: 5%; and $125,000: less than 1%.

particularly vulnerable group. See, e.g., Maria L. Imperial, Self-Sufficiency and Safety:
Welfare Reform for Victims of Domestic Violence, 5 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POV. 3, 10 (1997)
(discussing studies that show over half of the women on welfare-to-work programs
were victims of domestic abuse).
61. URIAH KING ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, RACE MATTERS: THE
CONCENTRATION OF PAYDAY LENDERS IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS IN
NORTH CAROLINA 2 (2005), http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rr006Race_Matters_Payday_in_NC-0305.pdf.
62. Id.
63. Johnson, supra note 21, at 99. Illinois, Wisconsin, and California were
included in these surveys. Id.
64. Id. The six states are Kentucky, Missouri, Mississippi, Tennessee, South
Carolina, and North Carolina. Id. at 99 n.525. According to census data, the
median household income in 2007 in the United States reached $50,233. Press
Release, U.S. Census Bureau News, Household Income Rises, Poverty Rate
Unchanged,
Number
of
Uninsured
Down
(Aug.
26,
2008),
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/income_wealth/01
2528.html.
65. Nixon et al., supra note 1.
66. Cummins, supra note 49 (citing Minnesota Department of Commerce
data analyzed by the Legal Services Advocacy Project).
67. Id. (analyzing census data and data from the Minnesota Department of
Commerce and Reference USA).
68. Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss3/10

8

Hayes: A Noose Around the Neck: Preventing Abusive Payday Lending Practi

1142

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:3

C. The Troublesome Features of Payday Loans
1.

Triple-Digit Interest Rates

In addition to exploiting low-income individuals and minority
groups, payday loans come with additional features that trap
unwary consumers. First, payday lenders charge inordinate fees
69
that amount to annual percentage rates (“APR”) of 700%. For
example, when a consumer receives a $100 loan and writes a check
70
for $115, the $15 fee translates to an APR of 390%. A Consumer
Federation of America (“CFA”) survey of 230 payday lenders in
1999 found that lenders who made payday loans of $100 to $400
71
had interest rates of 390% to 871%. Another CFA survey of 235
payday lenders in 2001 found that one-third of the lenders charged
72
an APR greater than 500% for a fourteen-day loan of $100. In
comparison, organized crime loan sharks in Las Vegas give better
73
74
rates. They typically charge 5% interest per week, or 260% APR.
2.

The Debt Treadmill

Another feature of payday loans traps consumers in a debt
75
treadmill. An especially dangerous feature of the payday loan is
76
its rollover feature. Industry officials claim that rollovers rarely
occur, with “only a tiny number of transactions result[ing] in more
than one rollover, of the perhaps 10% of transactions that result in
77
Yet, audits conducted by various state
any rollovers at all.”
agencies demonstrate that consumers renewed their loans on

69. Elizabeth Renuart & Jean Ann Fox, Payday Loans: A High Cost for a Small
Loan in Low-Income and Working Communities, 34 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 589, 589
(2001) (citing data collected by the Colorado and Indiana credit code
enforcement agencies).
70. Chin, supra note 51, at 728–29.
71. SHOW ME THE MONEY!, supra note 22, at 1.
72. FOX & MIERZWINSKI, supra note 58, at 5.
73. Chin, supra note 51, at 729.
74. Id.
75. Charles A. Bruch, Comment, Taking the Pay Out of Payday Loans: Putting
an End to the Usurious and Unconscionable Interest Rates Charged by Payday Lenders, 69
U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1273–74 (2001) (comparing payday loans and the “debt
treadmill” to pawnbroking, title pawns, and RTO agreements).
76. Chin, supra note 51, at 729.
77. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 18, at 606 n.91 (quoting testimony from
Senator Joseph Lieberman’s Forum on Payday Lending that occurred on
December 15, 1999).
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average ten to twelve times during a twelve-month period. A study
conducted by the Center for Responsible Lending showed that
payday lenders extend 91% of payday loans to consumers who take
out five or more loans per year and that the average consumer
79
received between eight and thirteen loans each year.
Additionally, many consumers use a second payday loan from
80
another lender to pay off their first payday loan.
In Minnesota, a sixty-one-year-old man, Reye DeLowell, turned
to payday lenders for help even though he worked two jobs as a
81
What was meant to be a short, temporary
hotel custodian.
82
solution quickly turned into a long-term insoluble problem.
During a three-month period, DeLowell incurred more than $200
83
Thus, despite
in fees to essentially re-borrow the same $250.
84
industry assertions to the contrary, the payday lenders have every
incentive to keep consumers in a perpetual cycle of debt, because a
majority of payday lenders’ revenue is generated from repeat
85
transactions.
3.

Coercive Debt Collection Practices

Payday lenders frequently employ coercive techniques and
86
intimidate consumers to collect debts. Payday lenders threaten to
pursue civil and criminal remedies under bad-check statutes and
often collect treble damages and attorneys’ fees in addition to
87
regular bounced-check fees. Despite efforts by states to exempt
78.
79.

KEEST & RENUART, supra note 43, § 7.5.5.4.
KEITH ERNST ET AL., CTR FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, QUANTIFYING THE
ECONOMIC COST OF PREDATORY PAYDAY LENDING 5 tbl. 1, 7 (2004),
http://responsiblelending.org/pdfs/CRLpaydaylendingstudy121803.pdf.
80. Paul Chessin, Borrowing from Peter to Pay Paul: A Statistical Analysis of
Colorado’s Deferred Deposit Loan Act, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 387, 411 (2005).
81. Nixon et al., supra note 1.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See C MTY. F IN. S ERVS. A SS ’ N OF A M., B EST P RACTICES FOR THE P AYDAY
A DVANCE I NDUSTRY (2008), http://www.moneytreeinc.com/documents/
CFSA%20Best%20Practices_Feb08.pdf [hereinafter BEST PRACTICES]. Community
Financial Services of America, a payday lender lobbying organization, states that
members of the organization shall not allow a consumer to rollover a loan except
when expressly authorized by state law. Id. Even when states allow rollovers,
members shall limit a consumer to four rollovers or the state prescribed annual
limit, whichever is less. Id.
85. Chessin, supra note 80, at 411; Johnson, supra note 21, at 69–70.
86. Chin, supra note 51, at 732.
87. Bertics, supra note 42, at 140; Johnson, supra note 21, at 77–78.
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payday-loan consumers from liability under bad-check statutes,
payday lenders continue to use these statutes to collect on their
88
For example, a nineteen-year-old woman in Alabama
loans.
found herself in jail after she missed a payment on a $200 payday
89
loan. The payday lender promised the nineteen-year-old a few
more days to repay the loan but instead deposited her check; when
90
it bounced, he sent a sheriff after her.
The same coercive techniques occur in Minnesota. For
example, one payday lender repeatedly contacted a consumer at
91
work in a deliberate attempt to embarrass her. The payday lender
sent two faxes to the senior management office at the consumer’s
92
The faxes contained a photocopied image of the
work place.
consumer’s check that contained the letters “NSF NSF NSF NSF,”
93
which stands for “non-sufficient funds.” The fax also included a
handwritten note that stated, in part, “[g]uess I put trust in the
wrong people. Should I begin legal action, or can I trust you to
94
95
In violation of Minnesota law, the payday
begin payments?”
lender also sent its own form—not the legally authorized form—to
96
garnish the consumer’s wages.
III. MINNESOTA STATE REGULATION OF PAYDAY LENDERS
A. Minnesota Consumer Small Loan Statute
Legal scholars place states’ regulations of payday lenders into
97
The first consists of twelve states as well as the
three groups.
Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico, which have usury statutes that cap
the interest rate at or around 36%, which effectively bans payday
88. MINN. STAT. § 609.535, subdiv. 5 (2008) (stating that penalties of the badcheck statute do not apply to postdated checks); Johnson, supra note 21, at 80–83
(discussing Ohio payday lenders who continue to collect treble damages for bad
checks even though the Ohio legislature has barred the practice).
89. Dean Foust et al., Easy Money: Subprime Lenders Make a Killing Catering to
Poorer Americans, BUS. WK., Apr. 24, 2000, at 107.
90. Id.
91. Complaint at 6, Gorecki v. Kwik Cash, No. 07CV02064, 2007 WL 2125572
(D. Minn. Apr. 26, 2007).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. MINN. STAT. § 571.72, subdivs. 4, 5, & 7 (2008). These subdivisions outline
the procedures and forms needed to garnish a person’s wages. Id.
96. Complaint at 7, Gorecki, 2007 WL 2125572.
97. KEEST & RENUART, supra note 43, § 7.5.5.5.
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98

lending.
The second group consists only of New Mexico and
99
Lenders in these two states must comply with an
Wisconsin.
100
ineffective small loan law. The third category consists of thirty-six
states along with the District of Columbia that have enacted laws or
regulations specifically aimed at governing payday loan
101
Such regulations, at a minimum, require licensing
transactions.
102
of lenders, disclosures, and limits on the amount of the loan.
Minnesota fits into the third category.
The consumer small loan statute in Minnesota provides several
substantive provisions that regulate payday lenders. First, the
103
statute mandates licensing and disclosure requirements. Second,
98. Id. The twelve states are Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Vermont, and West Virginia. Id. at 297 n.479.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. ALA. CODE §§ 5-18-1 to -18 (LexisNexis 1996 & Supp. 2008); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 6.50.010–.900 (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-125 (2008); CAL. FIN. CODE
§§ 23000–23106 (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-3.1-101 to -123 (West
2002 & Supp. 2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 2227–2243 (2001 & Supp.
2006); D.C. CODE ANN. § 26-301 (LexisNexis 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 560.401
(West 2002); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 480F-1 to -7 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp.
2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 28-46-401 to -413 (2005 & Supp. 2008); 815 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 122/1-1 to 99/99 (West Supp. 2008); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-4.5-7-101 to
-413 (West 2006 & Supp. 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 533D.1–.16 (West 2001 &
Supp. 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-2-404 (2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 286.9-010–
.990 (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 9:3578.1 to .8 (Supp.
2009); MICH.
COMP.
LAWS
ANN.
§
487.2121 (2008); MINN.
STAT.
§ 47.60 (2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-67-501 to -539 (2000 & Supp. 2007); MO.
ANN. STAT. § 408.500 (West Supp. 2009); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 31-1-701 to -728
(2008); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-904 to -929 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp.
2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 604A.050 to .850 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 399-A:13 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2008); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 13-08-01 to -15 (2004 & Supp. 2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1315.35 to .99
(West 2004 & Supp. 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 3101–3119 (West Supp.
2009); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 725.600–.910 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 19-14.4-1 to -10 (1998 & Supp. 2008); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 34-39-110 to -260
(Supp. 2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 54-4-36 to -66 (2004 & Supp. 2008); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 45-17-101 to -117 (2007 & Supp. 2008) and TENN. COMP. R. & REGS.
0180-28-.01 (2008); 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 83.604(b) and TEX. FIN. CODE ANN.
§§ 342.251–.259 (Vernon 2006 & Supp. 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 7-23-01 to -109
(2006 & Supp. 2008); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-444 to -471 (West Supp. 2008) and 10
VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-200-10 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 31.45.010 (West
2008) and WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 208-630-120 (2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-14-362
to -364 (2007).
102. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 2005 SUMMARY OF STATE PAYDAY LOAN ACTS
(Nov.
2005),
http://www.consumerlaw.org/issues/payday_loans/content/
NCLC_SUMMARY.pdf.
103. MINN. STAT. § 47.60, subdivs. 3–4 (2008).
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the statute allows, but does not require, a payday lender to offer a
104
Third, the statute sets
maximum term of thirty calendar days.
limits on finance charges and fees based on the amount of the
105
106
Fourth, the statute caps payday loans at $350.
Fifth, it
loan.
107
Sixth,
forbids rollovers or concurrent loans in excess of $350.
failure to comply with the statute’s requirements constitutes a
108
Seventh, the law is enforced by investigating
misdemeanor.
consumer complaints concerning payday lenders filed with the
109
Commissioner of Commerce.
B. Weaknesses
While Minnesota’s statute appears strong, it provides marginal
110
protection for consumers in practice.
First, the statute fails to
protect consumers from the debt treadmill. The statute prohibits
rollovers but consumers can pay back one loan and immediately
111
Additionally, the statute has no mechanism in
take out another.
place to determine whether consumers have any other outstanding
112
Thus, consumers could easily
loans with other payday lenders.
avoid the statute’s limits by obtaining additional payday loans from
other lenders.
Another weakness concerns the statute’s enforcement
113
The
procedure, “which is based upon consumer complaints.”
104. Id., subdiv. 2(b).
105. Id., subdiv. 2(a).
106. Id., subdiv. 1(a).
107. Id., subdiv. 2(f). The loan statute states:
A loan made under this section must not be repaid by the proceeds of
another loan under this section by the same lender or related interest.
The proceeds from a loan made under this section must not be applied
to another loan from the same lender or related interest. No loan to a
single borrower made pursuant to this section shall be split or divided
and no single borrower shall have outstanding more than one loan with
the result of collecting a higher charge than permitted by this section or
in an aggregate amount of principal exceed at any one time the
maximum of $350.
Id.
108. Id., subdiv. 6.
109. Id., subdiv. 5.
110. Noyes, supra note 47, at 1649 (citing Telephone Interview with Ron
Elwood, Attorney, Legal Servs. Advocacy Project (Oct. 19, 2005)).
111. Nixon et al., supra note 1.
112. § 47.60, subdiv. 2(f) (requiring that borrowers only have one payday loan
but failing to require a duty on lenders to determine whether consumers have
other outstanding payday loans).
113. Noyes, supra note 47, at 1649.
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Minnesota Department of Banking only audits lenders if a
complaint has been filed and the Department admittedly receives
114
“very few” complaints. Consumers typically blame themselves for
having incurred debt, fail to grasp that the law has been violated,
115
and do not file complaints.
The major flaw in the statute, however, lies in the ease with
which many payday lenders are able to evade the statute and
operate outside of it. Three of the four biggest payday lenders
116
operate under Minnesota’s industrial loan and thrift statute.
These three lenders account for roughly 70% of the payday loans
117
For example, a $100 loan under the
in Minnesota during 2006.
consumer small loan statute carries an APR of 391% as opposed to
118
a $100 loan under the thrift statute with an APR as high as 685%.
Additionally, the statute fails to address the coercive collection
techniques that accompany payday loans. Thus, Minnesota’s small
loan statute as drafted is ineffective.
IV. STRENGTHENING MINNESOTA’S CONSUMER SMALL LOAN
STATUTE AND DEVELOPING WAYS TO PREVENT ABUSIVE,
HIGH-RATE PAYDAY LENDERS
A. Strengthening the Minnesota Statute
Minnesota needs to amend the current statute to prevent the
most harmful effects of payday loans. To accomplish this task, the
Minnesota Legislature should incorporate various parts of the
119
AARP Public Policy Institute’s Model Statute, parts of other state
laws, and parts of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.
First, the legislature should cap the interest rates on payday
loans at 36% APR. Fifteen states have already done this, which

114. Id. (citing Telephone Interview with Ted Ellingson, Review Exam’r,
Comm’n of Commerce, Minn. Dep’t of Banking (Feb. 27, 2006)).
115. Senate Forum on Short-Term, High-Interest Paycheck Advances: Forum Before the
S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. (1999) (testimony of Jean Ann Fox,
Dir. of Consumer Prot., Consumer Fed’n of Am.) (“They think it’s their fault that
they’re in debt over their heads and can’t get out, not that some law they never
heard of has been violated. So I’m not surprised about the complaints.”).
116. Cummins, supra note 49.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. ELIZABETH RENUART, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST., PAYDAY LOANS: A MODEL
STATE STATUTE 1 (2000), http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/consume/d16954_
payday.pdf.
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120

helps eliminate triple-digit interest rates.
Federal legislation has
also followed a similar approach. As payday lenders began to target
military families, Congress enacted the Talent Amendment, which
capped payday loan rates at 36% APR to members of the military
121
and their families.
Despite industry assertions, interest rate caps are necessary to
122
While
correct a market failure in the payday loan industry.
competition has increased between payday lenders, the market has
123
Studies show that interest
failed to produce lower interest rates.
rates have increased or remained the same despite the industry’s
124
In states with interest rate caps, a vast majority of the
growth.
payday lenders continue to charge the highest legal interest rate
125
Moreover, payday lenders do not compete based on
permitted.
price but instead primarily on name recognition, speed, and
126
Furthermore, payday lenders frequently
promotions or specials.
refuse to disclose the interest rate and other loan terms until after
the consumer applies for the loan, thereby preventing price
127
Thus, capping interest rates as opposed to relying
shopping.
upon market pressures will effectively prevent payday lenders from
128
charging triple-digit interest rates.
Additionally, society benefits as a whole from interest rate
129
Interest rate caps may restrict the availability of credit for
caps.
high-risk consumers and prevent some businesses from entering
130
Yet, creating entry barriers to discourage the
the industry.
unscrupulous lenders who focus on a comparatively narrow
120. KEEST & RENUART, supra note 43, § 7.5.5.5.
121. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,
Pub. L. No. 109-364, sec. 670, § 987(b), 120 Stat. 2083, 2266 (2006) (to be codified
at 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2006)).
122. Johnson, supra note 21, at 117–18; Bertics, supra note 42, at 142–45.
123. FOX & MIERZWINSKI, supra note 58, at 13–14.
124. Id. at 13.
125. Id. at 14; see Chessin, supra note 80, at 408–09 (noting that lenders
operating under Colorado’s payday loan statute mostly charge the statute’s
maximum allowable finance charge).
126. Bertics, supra note 42, at 143; Diane Hellwig, Note, Exposing the Loansharks
in Sheep’s Clothing: Why Re-Regulating the Consumer Credit Market Makes Economic
Sense, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1567, 1597–98 (2005).
127. Noyes, supra note 47, at 1662.
128. Id.
129. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 18, at 663–64.
130. Id.; see generally George J. Wallace, The Uses of Usury: Low Rate Ceilings
Reexamined, 56 B.U.L. REV. 451 (1976) (discussing the advantages of, and
providing ethical support for, low consumer-interest rate ceilings).
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economic base would prevent “reverse redlining” and
131
“discriminatory pricing.” Additionally, unregulated interest rates
prevent low-risk consumers from obtaining lower interest rates and
132
Moreover,
causes high default rates for high-risk consumers.
during periods of recession, households incur a rise in consumer
debt and an increased exposure to high-rate payday loans, which in
133
This is so since the money spent by
turn hurts other businesses.
households indebted to high-rate payday loans “is not available for
spending at the neighborhood grocery stores, service stations,
134
Payday lending
pharmacies, or other local businesses.”
consumers also constitute a growing share of bankruptcy
135
136
Bankruptcies hurt other creditors.
Creating
petitioners.
137
interest rate caps would mitigate the effects of high-rate debts.
Furthermore, states with interest rate caps at or around 36% for
payday loans have saved their consumers $1.5 billion while
138
preserving a “more responsible small loan market.”
Second, the legislature must require that payday lenders allow
consumers to make installment loans at a minimum term of no less
139
than two weeks for each $50 owed on the loan. A person earning
$35,000 a year has a difficult time paying back a typical payday loan
while still meeting basic expenses during one two-week pay
140
After paying back the payday loan and basic expenses, a
period.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Drysdale & Keest, supra note 18, at 663.
Id.
Id. at 663–64.
Id. at 664.
Robert Mayer, Payday Lending and Personal Bankruptcy, 50 CONSUMER
INTERESTS ANN. 76, 81 (2004) (noting that in the collected sample, payday loan
debtors increased in total numbers of personal bankruptcies, but did not
“outstrip” the general growth in bankruptcies filed in the sample counties from
2000–2002) [hereinafter Mayer, Payday Lending]; see generally Robert Mayer, One
Payday, Many Payday Loans: Short-Term Lending Abuse in Milwaukee County, 5–6
(Loyola
Univ.
Working
Paper
2005),
available
at
http://lwvmilwaukee.org/mayer21.pdf (discussing bankruptcy petitioners who
had pledged their entire next paycheck or more to payday lenders).
136. Mayer, Payday Lending, supra note 135, at 81 (noting that debt to benign
creditors would not be written off due to bankruptcy filings likely caused by
multiple payday loans).
137. Robin A. Morris, Consumer Debt and Usury: A New Rationale for Usury, 15
PEPP. L. REV. 151, 177–78 (1988).
138. URIAH KING & LESLIE PARRISH, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, SPRINGING
THE DEBT TRAP: RATE CAPS ARE ONLY PROVEN PAYDAY LENDING REFORM, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY 5 (2007), http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/springing-the-debttrap-exec-summary.pdf.
139. RENUART, supra note 119, at 17.
140. KING & PARRISH, supra note 138, at 4.
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person earning $35,000 annually is left with a $112 deficit. Thus,
requiring payday lenders to allow consumers to make installment
payments on their loans ensures a better chance of paying off the
loan rather than defaulting.
Third, the legislature needs a more effective prohibition of
rollovers. Although rollovers are currently prohibited, Minnesota’s
142
A
small loan statute does not have a cooling-off period.
consumer can therefore close out the loan and reopen it, creating
143
Additionally,
a back-to-back transaction, or essentially a rollover.
Minnesota does not require a payday lender to inquire whether the
consumer has any outstanding payday loans with any other payday
144
lenders. To prevent rollovers, Minnesota should prohibit payday
lenders from issuing more than one payday loan to the same
145
A thirty-day cooling-off period
consumer for at least thirty days.
146
can prevent subterfuge, like back-to-back transactions.
Minnesota should also mandate the creation of a real-time
enforcement database similar to Florida’s database to ensure that
consumers do not receive more than one payday loan at a time. In
Florida, the Department of Banking and Finance partnered with
Veritec Solutions, a private company, to create a real-time
147
Payday lenders finance the database by paying up to
database.
148
A payday lender must check a
one dollar per transaction.
141. Id. (citing expenditure data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 2005
Consumer Expenditure Survey).
142. MINN. STAT. § 47.60, subdiv. 2(f) (2008).
143. Mark Flannery & Katherine Samolyk, Payday Lending: Do the Costs Justify the
Price?, 4 n.10 (FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 2005-09, 2005),
available at http://www.chicagofed.org/cedric/files/2005_conf_paper_session1_
flannery.pdf. A rollover requires only payment of additional fees, while a renewal
requires repayment of the loan in full before a new loan is extended. Id.
Generally, there is no distinction between these two types of transactions. Id.
144. See § 47.60, subdiv. 2(f) (“A loan made under this section must not be
repaid by the proceeds of another loan made under this section by the same
lender or related interest. The proceeds from a loan made under this section
must not be applied to another loan from the same lender or related interest.”).
While providing this directive, the statute never requires the payday lender to
check for other outstanding loans.
145. RENUART, supra note 119, at 22.
146. Id.
147. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 560.404(23) (2002); Press Release, Veritec Solutions,
LLC, The State of Florida Selects Veritec Solutions to Develop and Manage the
Deferred Presentment Customer Eligibility Verification and Transaction
Authorization System (Dec. 5, 2001), http://www.veritecs.com/selectveritec12_
05_01.htm.
148. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 560.404(23) (2002); FLA. DEP’T OF BANKING & FIN.,
DEFERRED PRESENTMENT PROGRAM, 2002 ANNUAL PROGRAM REPORT TO THE
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consumer’s loan eligibility by entering the consumer’s information
149
If the consumer fails to satisfy the
into a centralized database.
150
statutory restrictions, the transaction cannot be completed.
Florida’s database compiles data that allows regulatory agencies to
151
Thus,
monitor payday loan activities throughout the state.
Florida’s database effectively prevents a consumer from being
issued more than one payday loan at a time and provides regulators
152
with valuable information about the payday loan industry.
Fourth, Minnesota should require payday lenders to determine
a consumer’s ability to repay loans and restrict the amount that
153
Indiana’s
consumers can borrow based upon their income.
payday loan statute prohibits lenders from lending more than 20%
154
Limiting the amount consumers
of a consumer’s gross income.
borrow based on their income prevents them from pledging their
next paycheck, or more to payday lenders, and decreases the
155
This would burden payday lenders with
probability of default.
156
However, requiring payday lenders to
more responsibilities.
determine a consumer’s ability to pay back the loan “prevent[s]
157
consumers from becoming further overwhelmed by debt.”
Fifth, Minnesota must prohibit abusive debt collection
158
The Community Financial Services
practices by payday lenders.
Association of America (“CFSAA”), a lobbying group for payday
lenders, currently encourages members to “collect past due
159
The CFSAA
accounts in a professional, fair and lawful manner.”
also encourages members not to use unlawful threats, intimidation,
or harassment and to use the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

LEGISLATURE 4 (2003), http://www.veritecs.com/Annualreport.pdf [hereinafter
DEFERRED PRESENTMENT PROGRAM].
149. See Veritec Solutions, LLC, Applying Business Intelligence to Payday
Lending Regulatory Solutions, http://www.veritecs.com/PaydaySolution.htm (last
visited Mar. 20, 2009).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See DEFERRED PRESENTMENT PROGRAM, supra note 148, at 4.
153. Noyes, supra note 47, at 1665 (recommending that Wisconsin adopt this
approach).
154. IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-7-402(1) (Supp. 2008).
155. Noyes, supra note 47, at 1665.
156. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 140 (advocating this approach, which is
already used by mortgage lenders, for enactment at the federal level).
157. Noyes, supra note 47, at 1665.
158. See supra Part II.C.3.
159. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 84.
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(“FDCPA”) as a guide when collecting on past due accounts.
The FDCPA prohibits “any conduct the natural consequence
of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection
162
This includes the threat of or use
with the collection of a debt.”
of violence, obscene or profane language, or engaging a person in
a telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously when
163
The FDCPA also prohibits “any
attempting to collect a debt.
false, deceptive, or misleading representation in connection with
164
This section of the FDCPA includes
the collection of any debt.”
165
an extensive list of prohibited conduct. For example, it prohibits
the “false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of
166
167
any debt,” threats to take action that cannot be legally taken, or
the “use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect
168
or attempt to collect any debt.” The FDCPA only applies to third169
party debt collectors and cannot impose liability against payday
170
The
lenders who collect their own delinquent accounts.
Minnesota Legislature should incorporate the CFSAA
recommendations and the above-referenced FDCPA provisions to
bring to a halt the abusive and coercive methods used by payday
171
lenders who collect overdue accounts.
Sixth, the Minnesota Legislature must create an effective
enforcement mechanism. Minnesota legislators should create a
private right of action that allows for actual, consequential, and
172
plus statutory damages up to $1,000 and
punitive damages,
160. 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2006).
161. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 84.
162. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d (2006).
163. Id. § 1692d(1)–(2), (5).
164. Id. § 1692e.
165. Id.
166. Id. § 1692e(2)(A).
167. Id. § 1692e(5).
168. Id. § 1692e(10).
169. Id. § 1692a(6).
170. Johnson, supra note 21, at 81 (stating that payday lenders ordinarily
collect their own debt and are therefore not considered “debt collectors” under
the FDCPA definition); see § 1692a(6)(A) (excluding from liability under the
FDCPA any officer or employee of a creditor who collects debt in the name of the
creditor for the creditor).
171. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 77–78 (discussing the inappropriate
collection practices of some payday lenders); supra Part II.C.3; see also Johnson,
supra note 21, at 92–93 (discussing how even though Ohio law does not permit
prosecution of payday loan consumers under its bad-check statute, criminal
prosecutions still occur).
172. RENUART, supra note 119, at 23.
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173

reasonable attorneys’ fees.
Currently, Minnesota allows a
consumer to recover up to $100 for each violation of the consumer
174
However, Minnesota does not allow for the
small loan statute.
recovery for actual, consequential, or punitive damages; nor does it
175
Additionally, Minnesota’s
allow for recovery of attorneys’ fees.
enforcement mechanism for violations relies on consumer
176
Even if
complaints with the Commissioner of Commerce.
consumers filed complaints, enforcement through the
Commissioner of Commerce may be inadequate given the growth
of the payday lending industry, and because agencies frequently
lack sufficient resources to investigate problems and undertake
177
enforcement actions. Thus, creating a private right of action can
178
help assist consumers who have been injured by a violation.
Furthermore, a strong enforcement mechanism is essential to
179
enforcing these substantive regulations.
Finally, Minnesota must require that all payday lenders operate
under the consumer small loan statute. As of February 2009, only
fifty-eight payday lending locations held licenses under Minnesota’s
180
Three of the four largest payday lenders in
small loan law.
Minnesota operate under the industrial loan and thrift statute,
181
Thus, it is necessary to close this
which allows for higher fees.
loophole to make Minnesota’s consumer small loan statute
effective.

173. The FDCPA allows for the recovery of statutory damages up to $1,000 and
for the recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A), (3)
(2006).
174. MINN. STAT. § 56.19, subdiv. 2a (2008) (allowing up to $100 in damages for
each violation against any lender who intentionally violates the consumer small
loan statute). See also MINN. STAT. § 47.60, subdiv. 6 (2008) (imposing liability upon
others who violate or participate in the violation of any provision of the consumer
small loan statute in the same manner as in section 56.19).
175. See § 56.19, subdiv. 4 (stating that the remedies in section 56.19 are
exclusive).
176. § 47.60, subdiv. 5.
177. RENUART, supra note 119, at 23.
178. Id.
179. See Noyes, supra note 47, at 1665–66 (advocating for strong enforcement
mechanisms for effective legislation).
180. Minn. Dep’t of Commerce, Small Lender Licensee List,
http://www.commerce.state.mn.us/FSLicensees/sl.html (last visited Mar. 20,
2009).
181. Cummins, supra note 49. See Minn. Dep’t of Commerce, Industrial Loan
List, http://www.commerce.state.mn.us/FSLicensees/il.html (last visited Mar. 20,
2009).
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An effective statute requires the Minnesota Legislature to
enact specific usury limits, prohibit rollovers and concurrent loans,
and assess a consumer’s ability to repay the loan. Additionally, an
effective statute must specifically address collection efforts, provide
an enforcement mechanism for consumers, and require payday
lenders to operate under the statute.
B. Litigation
Legislation can prevent some of the harmful effects on payday
182
Payday lenders
lending. It alone, however, will not suffice.
continuously repackage their products attempting to disguise the
183
To help combat
loans as something other than a payday loan.
such evasive maneuvers and limit the effects of payday lenders,
consumer advocates can utilize current legislation to bring lawsuits
against payday lenders.
184
The Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”),
the main federal
185
regulation that governs payday lenders, provides a useful tool for
combating payday lenders in the courtroom. Congress enacted
TILA in 1968 to increase consumers’ awareness of the cost of
186
The purpose was to “assure a meaningful disclosure of
credit.
credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more
readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the
187
uninformed use of credit.”
Payday lenders are bound by TILA’s disclosure requirements
188
because they are creditors that regularly issue consumer credit.
Despite the plain language, payday lenders originally claimed to be
182. Noyes, supra note 47, at 1666.
183. Erick Bergquist, Credit Line Is Key in Pa. Payday Twist, AM. BANKER, June 23,
2006, at 1. Advance America was no longer able to make payday loans in
Pennsylvania, so the company started offering open-credit lines for up to $500 that
charged a monthly participation fee of $149.95, plus principal and interest
payments. Id.
184. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–67 (2006).
185. Johnson, supra note 21, at 13. The Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) also governs payday lenders. 18 U.S.C §§ 1961–68
(2006). Passed by Congress in 1970, RICO is the other key federal law that affects
the payday lending industry. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (2006)).
RICO prohibits lenders from providing credit at a usurious rate, or twice the legal
interest rate. Id. § 1961(6). RICO allows the government to bring criminal
charges against payday lenders for RICO violations. Id. § 1963.
186. Johnson, supra note 21, at 13–14.
187. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006).
188. Johnson, supra note 21, at 14.
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189

exempt from TILA requirements.
Payday lenders argued that
they provide a service for a set fee and were therefore not required
190
191
The courts and the Federal Reserve
to comply with TILA.
192
Board, however, ruled that payday loans are consumer credit.
TILA’s remedial measures compensate consumers in the form
of statutory and actual damages for violations of TILA’s disclosure
193
Once a disclosure violation is established under
requirements.
TILA, statutory damages are automatically available regardless as to
194
Statutory damages are
whether an actual injury has occurred.
twice the amount of any finance charge in the particular
195
Conversely, actual damages are only available for
transaction.
196
actual compensatory injuries incurred by the violation.
197
TILA’s disclosure requirements are meticulously specific.
Violations occur for using the wrong typeface for a financing
198
term, or for failing to provide documents at the proper time
199
TILA also allows for class action
during the loan transaction.
200
lawsuits. Thus, the ease for which TILA can be violated provides
consumers with an important tool against payday lenders who run
201
afoul of the disclosure requirements.
189. Id. at 16. Payday lenders originally claimed they were not bound by TILA
because they were check-cashing services.
Id.
See generally Deborah A.
Schmedemann, Time and Money: One State’s Regulation of Check-Based Loans, 27 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 973, 976 (2000) (discussing the difference between checkcashing services and payday loans).
190. Bruch, supra note 75, at 1274–75.
191. See, e.g., Cashback Catalog Sales, Inc. v. Price, 102 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1382
(S.D. Ga. 2000); Turner v. E-Z Check Cashing of Cookeville, Tenn., Inc., 35 F.
Supp. 2d 1042, 1048 (M.D. Tenn. 1999).
192. Johnson, supra note 21, at 38.
193. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1)–(2) (2006).
194. Id. § 1640(a)(2)(A).
195. Id. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i).
196. Id. § 1640(a)(1). It is more difficult to prove actual injury and receive
damages compared to statutory damages under a violation of TILA’s disclosure
requirements. See Eugene J. Kelley, Jr. & John L. Ropiequet, Actual Damages Under
the TILA: Collapsing Class Actions, 55 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 200, 200 (2001).
197. Thomas A. Wilson, The Availability of Statutory Damages Under TILA to
Remedy the Sharp Practice of Payday Lenders, 7 N. C. BANKING INST. 339, 344 (2003).
198. Brown v. Payday Check Advance, Inc., 202 F.3d 987, 990 (7th Cir. 2000).
199. Kilbourn v. Candy Ford-Mercury, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 121, 124–25 (W.D.
Mich. 2002).
200. § 1640(a)(2)(B).
201. Payday Check Advance, Inc., 202 F.3d at 989–90; see Ann Hayes Peterson,
Payday Loans, CREDIT UNION MAG., Dec. 2000, at 57 (noting how payday lenders do
not follow TILA because they believe it does not apply to their business practices);
see, e.g., Kilbourn, 209 F.R.D. at 124–25 (regarding a class action against a financier
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Yet, TILA does have its shortcomings. The court in Brown v.
Payday Check Advance, Inc. limited statutory damages for only
202
violations of the paragraphs enumerated by section 1640(a)(4).
The court held that statutory damages are available “only for failing
to comply with the requirements of section 1635 of [TILA] or of
paragraph (2) (insofar as it requires a disclosure of the ‘amount
financed’), (3), (4), (5), (6), or (9) of section 1638(a) of
203
204
[TILA].” The Eighth Circuit has reached the same conclusion.
Statutory damages are automatic, as opposed to actual damages,
205
which are harder to prove.
Nonetheless, a consumer can use
TILA to his advantage.
For example, in Van Jackson v. Check ‘N Go of Illinois, Inc., the
plaintiffs successfully litigated a class action lawsuit against a payday
lender because the lender failed to disclose the check as a security
206
interest. A postdated check, which payday lenders frequently use
to secure the payday loan, is required to be disclosed as a security
207
TILA requires a lender, when credit is secured, to
interest.
provide a statement that a security interest had been taken in
208
property not purchased as part of the credit transaction.
In Van Jackson, the defendant’s disclosure regarding the check
as a security interest was not grouped together with the other
209
Instead the disclosure was placed on the
required disclosures.
back of the consumer loan agreement in small type under a
210
The court held that the
heading entitled “Method of Payment.”
of automobiles).
202. 202 F.3d at 989. Payday Check Advance is the first case concerning payday
loans and statutory damages under TILA.
203. Id. at 991 (emphasis added).
204. See e.g., Malchow v. GMI Acquisitions, Inc., Civ. No. 01-1662, 2002 WL
31185865, at *3–5 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2002); Peter v. Village Imports Co., Civ. No.
01-12, 2001 WL 1640130, at *3 (D. Minn. Oct. 9, 2001); Wojcik v. Courtesy Auto
Sales, Inc., No. 8:01CV506, 2002 WL 31663298, at *5 (D. Neb. Nov. 25, 2002).
205. Kelley & Ropiequet, supra note 196, at 200.
206. 123 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1080–81 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (granting plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment and awarding statutory damages).
207. Id. at 1083 (holding that a check is a security interest under 15 U.S.C
section 1638(a)(9)). See Smith v. Cash Store Mgmt., Inc., 195 F.3d 325, 331 (7th
Cir. 1999) (holding that a check is a security for a loan).
208. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(9) (2006). See also 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(m) (2008)
(stating that a security interest must be disclosed in other property and indentified
by item or type).
209. All disclosures required by federal law must be grouped together and
conspicuously segregated from other information. § 1638(b)(1).
210. Van Jackson v. Check ‘N Go of Illinois, Inc., 193 F.R.D. 544, 548 (N.D. Ill.
2000). The disclosure read as follows:
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defendant failed to comply with section 1638(a)(9) because the
security interest disclosure was not accessible to an average person
and was hidden among other material in fine print underneath the
211
“Method of Payment” heading. Thus, if a consumer can establish
that a payday lender did not make the disclosures enumerated
under section 1638(a)(9) accessible to an average person, that
consumer can be awarded statutory damages pursuant to section
212
1640(a)(4).
C. Market Pressure
An increase in the number of payday lenders has failed to
213
Increased competition from
decrease the costs of payday loans.
banks and credit unions in the payday loan market, however, could
214
A 2005
decrease prices and create more options for consumers.
study found that banks and credit unions could provide lower-cost,
215
Banks
small-dollar credit products compared to payday lenders.
and credit unions can provide lower-cost alternatives because they
have a preexisting infrastructure that helps minimize operational
216
Banks and credit unions already have the facilities, loan
costs.
217
Banks and credit unions
staff, and collection processes in place.
also have an established consumer base, which minimizes
You may prepay this contract in full at any time. In accordance with the
Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. Section 1615) and the Illinois
Consumer Installment Loan Act (205 ILCS 670/15), if you pay off this
loan you shall be entitled to a refund of the unearned portion of the
Finance Charge, unless that refund would be less than $1.00. The refund
will be calculated in accordance with the method required by the Truth
in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. Section 1615) and by the Illinois Consumer
Installment Loan Act (205 ILCS 670/15). Upon determination of the
amount owed based on your prepayment of the loan, we will return your
check, which was used as security for the loan, and request from you of
the amount due as revised in accordance with you prepayment.

Id.
211. Id.
212. See U.S. v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853, 860 (7th Cir. 1999). The
meaning of “disclosure” is “opening up to view, revelation, discovery, exposure.”
Id. (citing 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 738 (2d ed. 1989)); see also Basham v.
Fin. Am. Corp., 583 F.2d 918, 926 (7th Cir. 1978) (stating that disclosures must
follow a logical order and not be scattered throughout an agreement).
213. See supra notes 122–28 and accompanying text.
214. Bertics, supra note 42, at 149–50 (arguing that banks should compete with
payday lenders).
215. BAIR, supra note 30, at 28–29.
216. Id. at 28.
217. Id.
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218

marketing costs.
Banks and credit unions can market small-loan
products through preexisting channels, such as inserts in account
219
statements. Conversely, payday lenders must set up stores, recruit
220
staff, and use mass media to advertise.
Banks and credit unions can also provide lower-cost
alternatives because they can minimize losses by using direct
221
When a
deposit and automatic deductions for repayment.
payday lender cashes a consumer’s postdated check, the lender’s
check waits in line behind other withdrawals that occurred before
the payday lender attempted to cash the consumer’s postdated
222
check. Unlike payday lenders, banks and credit unions can make
a priority claim on checking account funds to ensure their loan is
223
Additionally, banks and credit unions derive their income
paid.
from a variety of products and services. Banks and credit unions
are therefore in an overall better position to provide small loans at
224
a lower cost than payday lenders.
Nevertheless, banks and credit unions have traditionally shied
225
Bank officials consider payday
away from offering payday loans.
loans to be high-risk products that require extremely high interest
226
rates to maintain profitability. Such loans would tarnish the bank
227
Banks are also
and credit union’s image in the community.
reluctant to enter the payday loan market due to a perceived
regulatory animosity toward partnerships involving federally
228
However, this perception
regulated banks and payday lenders.
229
Informally, bank regulators have
appears to be misguided.
“agreed that banks and credit unions should be encouraged to
230
develop low-cost small dollar credit products” for consumers.
Furthermore, developing low-cost payday loans can help banks and
credit unions earn credit under the Community Reinvestment Act,
which requires financial institutions to meet their communities’
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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231

credit needs.
Moreover, credit unions have developed successful and
232
In 2001, the North Carolina
profitable payday loan programs.
State Employees’ Credit Union (“NCSECU”) began offering a
revolving loan with a maximum balance of $500 and an APR of
233
The loan must be repaid in full on the consumer’s next
12%.
234
payday by automatic deduction. The charge for a $500, two-week
235
An applicant must have direct deposit
loan is less than $2.50.
236
An important feature
into their credit union account to qualify.
of the account is that it requires the consumer to put 5% of each
237
advance in a savings account. Access to the product is unlimited,
but if the consumer withdraws the savings, he cannot access the
238
product for six months.
The program has made a total of $305,405,278 in loans and
has generated $1,919,097 in interest income. Roughly 40,000
members use the product and about 70% use the product once a
month. Recurrent use, from a public policy standpoint, is less
problematic if the rate charged is comparable or less than a credit
239
Additionally, NCSECU officials hope that over time, the
card.
mandatory savings will decrease the consumer’s reliance on the
240
In less than eighteen months, the savings component
product.
has resulted in more than $6 million in new deposits for
241
NCSECU.
A New Orleans credit union has also developed a successful
242
ASI Federal Credit Union, a $200 million asset lowmodel.
income community development credit union located in an
economically distressed area of New Orleans, began offering $500
lines of credit at a 12% interest rate in 2002 along with other

231. Id.; see 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a) (2000). Higher favorable ratings under the
Community Reinvestment Act lead to fewer evaluations. See Chin, supra note 51, at
750.
232. BAIR, supra note 30, at 21–22.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 22.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 23.
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financial services. The line of credit has a flat fee of $4 a week.
With nearly 8,000 lines of credit issued in 2004, the product has
245
In 2003, the line of credit
been popular and profitable.
246
generated $947,000 in fees and $1,046,000 in 2004.
Providing small-loan alternatives can also help consumers
build a credit history so that they may qualify for larger, more
247
Banks and credit unions could
profitable loans in the future.
therefore remain profitable and compete with payday lenders;
offering lower prices could decrease the demand for high-cost
payday loans and force payday lenders to decide between offering
248
better terms or going out of business.
V. CONCLUSION
The payday loan industry is one more manifestation of various
short-term lending schemes that have plagued this country
throughout the past century by exploiting desperate, cash-strapped
249
This exploitation of low-income consumers not only
consumers.
harms the consumer, it also places a needless drag on the
250
The current lending crisis, which began in 2007 and
economy.
has led to the collapse of several major American financial
251
institutions, illustrates the need to curb abusive lending practices.
As credit tightens and our economy suffers in the current
recession, more consumers will continue to turn to payday loans.
The prevention of abusive lending practices and the promotion of
responsible lending not only benefits the economy but also the
impacted communities. The recommendations in this article can
both prevent abusive payday lending practices in Minnesota and
serve as a guide for other states. Low-income consumers who live
243. Id. at 23–24. ASI Federal Credit Union’s financial package also includes a
ten-minute phone card, free travelers checks, a free refund anticipation loan, and
twenty-five-cent money orders. Id. at 23.
244. Id. at 23.
245. Id. at 24.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 26.
248. See Bertics, supra note 42, at 149–50 (discussing banks’ and credit unions’
ability to offer payday loans and force payday lenders to offer lower prices).
249. Bruch, supra note 75, at 1287.
250. CONSUMERS UNION, THE NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER FED’N OF
AM., SMALL DOLLAR LOAN PRODUCTS, INTRODUCTION TO THE SCORECARD 3 (2008),
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/small_loan_scorecard_08.pdf.
251. See id. at 4 (discussing how stronger consumer protection guidelines
could have prevented the subprime mortgage lending crisis).
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paycheck to paycheck will at times have to rely on payday loans to
help manage unexpected expenses. However, payday loans do not
have to become a noose around the neck of such consumers.
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